Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable versatility in various NLP tasks but encounter distinct challenges in biomedical due to the complexities of language and data scarcity. This paper investigates LLMs application in the biomedical domain by exploring strategies to enhance their performance for the NER task. Our study reveals the importance of meticulously designed prompts in the biomedical. Strategic selection of in-context examples yields a marked improvement, offering ~15-20\% increase in F1 score across all benchmark datasets for biomedical few-shot NER. Additionally, our results indicate that integrating external biomedical knowledge via prompting strategies can enhance the proficiency of general-purpose LLMs to meet the specialized needs of biomedical NER. Leveraging a medical knowledge base, our proposed method, DiRAG, inspired by Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), can boost the zero-shot F1 score of LLMs for biomedical NER. Code is released at https://github.com/masoud-monajati/LLM_Bio_NER

The goal of diffusion generative models is to align the learned distribution with the real data distribution through gradient score matching. However, inherent limitations in training data quality, modeling strategies, and architectural design lead to inevitable gap between generated outputs and real data. To reduce this gap, we propose Weak-to-Strong Diffusion (W2SD), a novel framework that utilizes the estimated difference between existing weak and strong models (i.e., weak-to-strong difference) to approximate the gap between an ideal model and a strong model. By employing a reflective operation that alternates between denoising and inversion with weak-to-strong difference, we theoretically understand that W2SD steers latent variables along sampling trajectories toward regions of the real data distribution. W2SD is highly flexible and broadly applicable, enabling diverse improvements through the strategic selection of weak-to-strong model pairs (e.g., DreamShaper vs. SD1.5, good experts vs. bad experts in MoE). Extensive experiments demonstrate that W2SD significantly improves human preference, aesthetic quality, and prompt adherence, achieving SOTA performance across various modalities (e.g., image, video), architectures (e.g., UNet-based, DiT-based, MoE), and benchmarks. For example, Juggernaut-XL with W2SD can improve with the HPSv2 winning rate up to 90% over the original results. Moreover, the performance gains achieved by W2SD markedly outweigh its additional computational overhead, while the cumulative improvements from different weak-to-strong difference further solidify its practical utility and deployability.

The rapid rise of Language Models (LMs) has expanded their use in several applications. Yet, due to constraints of model size, associated cost, or proprietary restrictions, utilizing state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs is not always feasible. With open, smaller LMs emerging, more applications can leverage their capabilities, but selecting the right LM can be challenging. This work conducts an in-depth experimental analysis of the semantic correctness of outputs of 10 smaller, open LMs across three aspects: task types, application domains and reasoning types, using diverse prompt styles. We demonstrate that most effective models and prompt styles vary depending on the specific requirements. Our analysis provides a comparative assessment of LMs and prompt styles using a proposed three-tier schema of aspects for their strategic selection based on use-case and other constraints. We also show that if utilized appropriately, these LMs can compete with, and sometimes outperform, SOTA LLMs like DeepSeek-v2, GPT-3.5-Turbo, and GPT-4o.

Pretrained vision-language models (VLMs), e.g., CLIP, demonstrate impressive zero-shot capabilities on downstream tasks. Prior research highlights the crucial role of visual augmentation techniques, like random cropping, in alignment with fine-grained class descriptions generated by large language models (LLMs), significantly enhancing zero-shot performance by incorporating multi-view information. However, the inherent randomness of these augmentations can inevitably introduce background artifacts and cause models to overly focus on local details, compromising global semantic understanding. To address these issues, we propose an Attention-Based Selection (ABS) method from local details to global context, which applies attention-guided cropping in both raw images and feature space, supplement global semantic information through strategic feature selection. Additionally, we introduce a soft matching technique to effectively filter LLM descriptions for better alignment. ABS achieves state-of-the-art performance on out-of-distribution generalization and zero-shot classification tasks. Notably, ABS is training-free and even rivals few-shot and test-time adaptation methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/BIT-DA/ABS{darkgreen{https://github.com/BIT-DA/ABS}}.

Pretraining large language models effectively requires strategic data selection, blending and ordering. However, key details about data mixtures especially their scalability to longer token horizons and larger model sizes remain underexplored due to limited disclosure by model developers. To address this, we formalize the concept of two-phase pretraining and conduct an extensive systematic study on how to select and mix data to maximize model accuracies for the two phases. Our findings illustrate that a two-phase approach for pretraining outperforms random data ordering and natural distribution of tokens by 3.4% and 17% on average accuracies. We provide in-depth guidance on crafting optimal blends based on quality of the data source and the number of epochs to be seen. We propose to design blends using downsampled data at a smaller scale of 1T tokens and then demonstrate effective scaling of our approach to larger token horizon of 15T tokens and larger model size of 25B model size. These insights provide a series of steps practitioners can follow to design and scale their data blends.

Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for fine-tuning foundation models using distributed data in a privacy-preserving manner. Under limited computational resources, clients often find it more practical to fine-tune a selected subset of layers, rather than the entire model, based on their task-specific data. In this study, we provide a thorough theoretical exploration of selective layer fine-tuning in FL, emphasizing a flexible approach that allows the clients to adjust their selected layers according to their local data and resources. We theoretically demonstrate that the layer selection strategy has a significant impact on model convergence in two critical aspects: the importance of selected layers and the heterogeneous choices across clients. Drawing from these insights, we further propose a strategic layer selection method that utilizes local gradients and regulates layer selections across clients. The extensive experiments on both image and text datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy compared with several baselines, highlighting its advances in identifying critical layers that adapt to the client heterogeneity and training dynamics in FL.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks.

Object detection (OD), a crucial vision task, remains challenged by the lack of large training datasets with precise object localization labels. In this work, we propose ALWOD, a new framework that addresses this problem by fusing active learning (AL) with weakly and semi-supervised object detection paradigms. Because the performance of AL critically depends on the model initialization, we propose a new auxiliary image generator strategy that utilizes an extremely small labeled set, coupled with a large weakly tagged set of images, as a warm-start for AL. We then propose a new AL acquisition function, another critical factor in AL success, that leverages the student-teacher OD pair disagreement and uncertainty to effectively propose the most informative images to annotate. Finally, to complete the AL loop, we introduce a new labeling task delegated to human annotators, based on selection and correction of model-proposed detections, which is both rapid and effective in labeling the informative images. We demonstrate, across several challenging benchmarks, that ALWOD significantly narrows the gap between the ODs trained on few partially labeled but strategically selected image instances and those that rely on the fully-labeled data. Our code is publicly available on https://github.com/seqam-lab/ALWOD.

This paper formalizes an emerging learning paradigm that uses a trained model as a reference to guide and enhance the training of a target model through strategic data selection or weighting, named model steering. While ad-hoc methods have been used in various contexts, including the training of large foundation models, its underlying principles remain insufficiently understood, leading to sub-optimal performance. In this work, we propose a theory-driven framework for model steering called DRRho risk minimization, which is rooted in Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO). Through a generalization analysis, we provide theoretical insights into why this approach improves generalization and data efficiency compared to training without a reference model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such theoretical insights are provided for the new learning paradigm, which significantly enhance our understanding and practice of model steering. Building on these insights and the connection between contrastive learning and DRO, we introduce a novel method for Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP) with a reference model, termed DRRho-CLIP. Extensive experiments validate the theoretical insights, reveal a superior scaling law compared to CLIP without a reference model, and demonstrate its strength over existing heuristic approaches.

Recent advances in diffusion models have revolutionized 2D and 3D content creation, yet generating photorealistic dynamic 4D scenes remains a significant challenge. Existing dynamic 4D generation methods typically rely on distilling knowledge from pre-trained 3D generative models, often fine-tuned on synthetic object datasets. Consequently, the resulting scenes tend to be object-centric and lack photorealism. While text-to-video models can generate more realistic scenes with motion, they often struggle with spatial understanding and provide limited control over camera viewpoints during rendering. To address these limitations, we present PaintScene4D, a novel text-to-4D scene generation framework that departs from conventional multi-view generative models in favor of a streamlined architecture that harnesses video generative models trained on diverse real-world datasets. Our method first generates a reference video using a video generation model, and then employs a strategic camera array selection for rendering. We apply a progressive warping and inpainting technique to ensure both spatial and temporal consistency across multiple viewpoints. Finally, we optimize multi-view images using a dynamic renderer, enabling flexible camera control based on user preferences. Adopting a training-free architecture, our PaintScene4D efficiently produces realistic 4D scenes that can be viewed from arbitrary trajectories. The code will be made publicly available. Our project page is at https://paintscene4d.github.io/

We explore the impact of multi-source input strategies on machine translation (MT) quality, comparing GPT-4o, a large language model (LLM), with a traditional multilingual neural machine translation (NMT) system. Using intermediate language translations as contextual cues, we evaluate their effectiveness in enhancing English and Chinese translations into Portuguese. Results suggest that contextual information significantly improves translation quality for domain-specific datasets and potentially for linguistically distant language pairs, with diminishing returns observed in benchmarks with high linguistic variability. Additionally, we demonstrate that shallow fusion, a multi-source approach we apply within the NMT system, shows improved results when using high-resource languages as context for other translation pairs, highlighting the importance of strategic context language selection.

Early identification of sensitive cancer cell lines is essential for accelerating biomarker discovery and elucidating drug mechanism of action. Given the efficiency and low cost of small-scale drug screens relative to extensive omics profiling, we compared drug-response panel (DRP) descriptors against omics features for predictive capacity using gradient boosting tree models across the GDSC and CCLE drug response datasets. DRP descriptors consistently outperformed omics data across key performance metrics, with variable performance across different drugs. Using complementary explainability approaches, we confirmed known MAPK-inhibitor sensitivity signatures, and identified novel potential biomarker candidates for MEK1/2 and BTK/MNK inhibitors. Lastly, to demonstrate the utility of this approach in distinguishing phenotypes, we applied our models to the breast cancer line MCF7 versus the non-tumorigenic MCF10A, and successfully identified compounds that selectively inhibit MCF7 while sparing the non-tumorigenic MCF10A. This methodology, developed using focused drug and cell line panels, supports early-stage drug development by facilitating rational cell line selection and compound prioritisation, enabling more efficient biomarker identification and candidate assessment.

This study conducts a thorough evaluation of text augmentation techniques across a variety of datasets and natural language processing (NLP) tasks to address the lack of reliable, generalized evidence for these methods. It examines the effectiveness of these techniques in augmenting training sets to improve performance in tasks such as topic classification, sentiment analysis, and offensive language detection. The research emphasizes not only the augmentation methods, but also the strategic order in which real and augmented instances are introduced during training. A major contribution is the development and evaluation of Modified Cyclical Curriculum Learning (MCCL) for augmented datasets, which represents a novel approach in the field. Results show that specific augmentation methods, especially when integrated with MCCL, significantly outperform traditional training approaches in NLP model performance. These results underscore the need for careful selection of augmentation techniques and sequencing strategies to optimize the balance between speed and quality improvement in various NLP tasks. The study concludes that the use of augmentation methods, especially in conjunction with MCCL, leads to improved results in various classification tasks, providing a foundation for future advances in text augmentation strategies in NLP.

Instance selection (IS) is important in machine learning for reducing dataset size while keeping key characteristics. Current IS methods often struggle with capturing complex relationships in high-dimensional spaces and scale with large datasets. This paper introduces a graph attention-based instance selection (GAIS) method that uses attention mechanisms to identify informative instances through their structural relationships in graph representations. We present two approaches for scalable graph construction: a distance-based mini-batch sampling technique that reduces computation through strategic batch processing, and a hierarchical hashing approach that allows for efficient similarity computation through random projections. The mini-batch approach keeps class distributions through stratified sampling, while the hierarchical hashing method captures relationships at multiple granularities through single-level, multi-level, and multi-view variants. Experiments across 39 datasets show that GAIS achieves reduction rates above 96\% while maintaining or improving model performance relative to state-of-the-art IS methods. The findings shows that the distance-based mini-batch approach offers an optimal balance of efficiency and effectiveness for large-scale datasets, while multi-view variants provide superior performance for complex, high-dimensional data, demonstrating that attention-based importance scoring can effectively identify instances crucial for maintaining decision boundaries without requiring exhaustive pairwise comparisons.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

Feature Selection (FS) under domain adaptation (DA) is a critical task in machine learning, especially when dealing with limited target data. However, existing methods lack the capability to guarantee the reliability of FS under DA. In this paper, we introduce a novel statistical method to statistically test FS reliability under DA, named SFS-DA (statistical FS-DA). The key strength of SFS-DA lies in its ability to control the false positive rate (FPR) below a pre-specified level alpha (e.g., 0.05) while maximizing the true positive rate. Compared to the literature on statistical FS, SFS-DA presents a unique challenge in addressing the effect of DA to ensure the validity of the inference on FS results. We overcome this challenge by leveraging the Selective Inference (SI) framework. Specifically, by carefully examining the FS process under DA whose operations can be characterized by linear and quadratic inequalities, we prove that achieving FPR control in SFS-DA is indeed possible. Furthermore, we enhance the true detection rate by introducing a more strategic approach. Experiments conducted on both synthetic and real-world datasets robustly support our theoretical results, showcasing the superior performance of the proposed SFS-DA method.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown strong reasoning capabilities. However, a critical question remains: do these models possess genuine reasoning skills particularly complex strategic reasoning or are they primarily excelling at sophisticated pattern recognition within their training data? To address this question, this paper presents a chess testbed, ChessArena, to evaluate the strategic reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Chess requires complex strategic reasoning capabilities including long-term planning, strict rule comprehension, and multi-turn conversation memorization. Specifically, ChessArena is a competitive framework where LLMs play against each other, under four different play modes. The testbed is equipped with a ranking algorithm and a leaderboard. The testbed can also evaluate fine-grained capabilities including basic understanding, move selection, and puzzle solving. Over 13 LLMs with different modes are evaluated in ChessArena, playing over 800 games. The results reveal significant shortcomings in current LLMs: no model can beat Maia-1100 (a chess engine at human amateur level), while some even failed to defeat a random player that selects moves arbitrarily. We also present a strong baseline to the testbed: our fine-tuned Qwen3-8B substantially improved performance, approaching much larger state-of-the-art reasoning models.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

While AI agents have shown remarkable performance at various tasks, they still struggle with complex multi-modal applications, structured generation and strategic planning. Improvements via standard fine-tuning is often impractical, as solving agentic tasks usually relies on black box API access without control over model parameters. Inference-time methods such as Best-of-N (BON) sampling offer a simple yet effective alternative to improve performance. However, BON lacks iterative feedback integration mechanism. Hence, we propose Iterative Agent Decoding (IAD) which combines iterative refinement with dynamic candidate evaluation and selection guided by a verifier. IAD differs in how feedback is designed and integrated, specifically optimized to extract maximal signal from reward scores. We conduct a detailed comparison of baselines across key metrics on Sketch2Code, Text2SQL, and Webshop where IAD consistently outperforms baselines, achieving 3--6% absolute gains on Sketch2Code and Text2SQL (with and without LLM judges) and 8--10% gains on Webshop across multiple metrics. To better understand the source of IAD's gains, we perform controlled experiments to disentangle the effect of adaptive feedback from stochastic sampling, and find that IAD's improvements are primarily driven by verifier-guided refinement, not merely sampling diversity. We also show that both IAD and BON exhibit inference-time scaling with increased compute when guided by an optimal verifier. Our analysis highlights the critical role of verifier quality in effective inference-time optimization and examines the impact of noisy and sparse rewards on scaling behavior. Together, these findings offer key insights into the trade-offs and principles of effective inference-time optimization.

Given the increasing use of synthetic data in language model (LM) post-training, an LM's ability to generate high-quality data has become nearly as crucial as its ability to solve problems directly. While prior works have focused on developing effective data generation methods, they lack systematic comparison of different LMs as data generators in a unified setting. To address this gap, we propose AgoraBench, a benchmark that provides standardized settings and metrics to evaluate LMs' data generation abilities. Through synthesizing 1.26 million training instances using 6 LMs and training 99 student models, we uncover key insights about LMs' data generation capabilities. First, we observe that LMs exhibit distinct strengths. For instance, GPT-4o excels at generating new problems, while Claude-3.5-Sonnet performs better at enhancing existing ones. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that an LM's data generation ability doesn't necessarily correlate with its problem-solving ability. Instead, multiple intrinsic features of data quality-including response quality, perplexity, and instruction difficulty-collectively serve as better indicators. Finally, we demonstrate that strategic choices in output format and cost-conscious model selection significantly impact data generation effectiveness.

The rapid development and adoption of Generative AI (GAI) technology in the form of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Claude has greatly increased interest in agentic machines. This paper introduces the Autonomous Cognitive Entity (ACE) model, a novel framework for a cognitive architecture, enabling machines and software agents to operate more independently. Drawing inspiration from the OSI model, the ACE framework presents layers of abstraction to conceptualize artificial cognitive architectures. The model is designed to harness the capabilities of the latest generative AI technologies, including large language models (LLMs) and multimodal generative models (MMMs), to build autonomous, agentic systems. The ACE framework comprises six layers: the Aspirational Layer, Global Strategy, Agent Model, Executive Function, Cognitive Control, and Task Prosecution. Each layer plays a distinct role, ranging from setting the moral compass and strategic thinking to task selection and execution. The ACE framework also incorporates mechanisms for handling failures and adapting actions, thereby enhancing the robustness and flexibility of autonomous agents. This paper introduces the conceptual framework and proposes implementation strategies that have been tested and observed in industry. The goal of this paper is to formalize this framework so as to be more accessible.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

A total of 34% of AI research and development projects fails or are abandoned, according to a recent survey by Rackspace Technology of 1,870 companies. We propose a new strategic framework, aiSTROM, that empowers managers to create a successful AI strategy based on a thorough literature review. This provides a unique and integrated approach that guides managers and lead developers through the various challenges in the implementation process. In the aiSTROM framework, we start by identifying the top n potential projects (typically 3-5). For each of those, seven areas of focus are thoroughly analysed. These areas include creating a data strategy that takes into account unique cross-departmental machine learning data requirements, security, and legal requirements. aiSTROM then guides managers to think about how to put together an interdisciplinary artificial intelligence (AI) implementation team given the scarcity of AI talent. Once an AI team strategy has been established, it needs to be positioned within the organization, either cross-departmental or as a separate division. Other considerations include AI as a service (AIaas), or outsourcing development. Looking at new technologies, we have to consider challenges such as bias, legality of black-box-models, and keeping humans in the loop. Next, like any project, we need value-based key performance indicators (KPIs) to track and validate the progress. Depending on the company's risk-strategy, a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) can help further classify the shortlisted projects. Finally, we should make sure that our strategy includes continuous education of employees to enable a culture of adoption. This unique and comprehensive framework offers a valuable, literature supported, tool for managers and lead developers.

A key aspect of temporal domains is the ability to make predictions multiple time steps into the future, a process known as multi-step forecasting (MSF). At the core of this process is selecting a forecasting strategy, however, with no existing frameworks to map out the space of strategies, practitioners are left with ad-hoc methods for strategy selection. In this work, we propose Stratify, a parameterised framework that addresses multi-step forecasting, unifying existing strategies and introducing novel, improved strategies. We evaluate Stratify on 18 benchmark datasets, five function classes, and short to long forecast horizons (10, 20, 40, 80). In over 84% of 1080 experiments, novel strategies in Stratify improved performance compared to all existing ones. Importantly, we find that no single strategy consistently outperforms others in all task settings, highlighting the need for practitioners explore the Stratify space to carefully search and select forecasting strategies based on task-specific requirements. Our results are the most comprehensive benchmarking of known and novel forecasting strategies. We make code available to reproduce our results.

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in well-defined problems with clear solutions, such as mathematics and coding. However, they still struggle with complex real-world scenarios like business negotiations, which require strategic reasoning-an ability to navigate dynamic environments and align long-term goals amidst uncertainty. Existing methods for strategic reasoning face challenges in adaptability, scalability, and transferring strategies to new contexts. To address these issues, we propose explicit policy optimization (EPO) for strategic reasoning, featuring an LLM that provides strategies in open-ended action space and can be plugged into arbitrary LLM agents to motivate goal-directed behavior. To improve adaptability and policy transferability, we train the strategic reasoning model via multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) using process rewards and iterative self-play, without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a preliminary step. Experiments across social and physical domains demonstrate EPO's ability of long-term goal alignment through enhanced strategic reasoning, achieving state-of-the-art performance on social dialogue and web navigation tasks. Our findings reveal various collaborative reasoning mechanisms emergent in EPO and its effectiveness in generating novel strategies, underscoring its potential for strategic reasoning in real-world applications.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We investigate non-collaborative dialogue agents, which are expected to engage in strategic conversations with diverse users, for securing a mutual agreement that leans favorably towards the system's objectives. This poses two main challenges for existing dialogue agents: 1) The inability to integrate user-specific characteristics into the strategic planning, and 2) The difficulty of training strategic planners that can be generalized to diverse users. To address these challenges, we propose Trip to enhance the capability in tailored strategic planning, incorporating a user-aware strategic planning module and a population-based training paradigm. Through experiments on benchmark non-collaborative dialogue tasks, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Trip in catering to diverse users.

Personalized treatment effect estimates are often of interest in high-stakes applications -- thus, before deploying a model estimating such effects in practice, one needs to be sure that the best candidate from the ever-growing machine learning toolbox for this task was chosen. Unfortunately, due to the absence of counterfactual information in practice, it is usually not possible to rely on standard validation metrics for doing so, leading to a well-known model selection dilemma in the treatment effect estimation literature. While some solutions have recently been investigated, systematic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different model selection criteria is still lacking. In this paper, instead of attempting to declare a global `winner', we therefore empirically investigate success- and failure modes of different selection criteria. We highlight that there is a complex interplay between selection strategies, candidate estimators and the data used for comparing them, and provide interesting insights into the relative (dis)advantages of different criteria alongside desiderata for the design of further illuminating empirical studies in this context.

Selecting the best code solution from multiple generated ones is an essential task in code generation, which can be achieved by using some reliable validators (e.g., developer-written test cases) for assistance. Since reliable test cases are not always available and can be expensive to build in practice, researchers propose to automatically generate test cases to assess code solutions. However, when both code solutions and test cases are plausible and not reliable, selecting the best solution becomes challenging. Although some heuristic strategies have been proposed to tackle this problem, they lack a strong theoretical guarantee and it is still an open question whether an optimal selection strategy exists. Our work contributes in two ways. First, we show that within a Bayesian framework, the optimal selection strategy can be defined based on the posterior probability of the observed passing states between solutions and tests. The problem of identifying the best solution is then framed as an integer programming problem. Second, we propose an efficient approach for approximating this optimal (yet uncomputable) strategy, where the approximation error is bounded by the correctness of prior knowledge. We then incorporate effective prior knowledge to tailor code generation tasks. Both theoretical and empirical studies confirm that existing heuristics are limited in selecting the best solutions with plausible test cases. Our proposed approximated optimal strategy B4 significantly surpasses existing heuristics in selecting code solutions generated by large language models (LLMs) with LLM-generated tests, achieving a relative performance improvement by up to 50% over the strongest heuristic and 246% over the random selection in the most challenging scenarios. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ZJU-CTAG/B4.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Recent advancements in Vision Language Models (VLMs) have expanded their capabilities to interactive agent tasks, yet existing benchmarks remain limited to single-agent or text-only environments. In contrast, real-world scenarios often involve multiple agents interacting within rich visual and linguistic contexts, posing challenges with both multimodal observations and strategic interactions. To bridge this gap, we introduce Visual Strategic Bench (VS-Bench), a multimodal benchmark that evaluates VLMs for strategic reasoning and decision-making in multi-agent environments. VS-Bench comprises eight vision-grounded environments spanning cooperative, competitive, and mixed-motive interactions, designed to assess agents' ability to predict others' future moves and optimize for long-term objectives. We consider two complementary evaluation dimensions, including offline evaluation of strategic reasoning by next-action prediction accuracy and online evaluation of decision-making by normalized episode return. Extensive experiments of fourteen leading VLMs reveal a significant gap between current models and optimal performance, with the best models attaining 47.8% prediction accuracy and 24.3% normalized return. We further conduct in-depth analyses on multimodal observations, test-time scaling, social behaviors, and failure cases of VLM agents. By standardizing the evaluation and highlighting the limitations of existing models, we envision VS-Bench as a foundation for future research on strategic multimodal agents. Code and data are available at https://vs-bench.github.io.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Game playing has long served as a fundamental benchmark for evaluating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in general reasoning, their effectiveness in spatial strategic reasoning, which is critical for complex and fully observable board games, remains insufficiently explored. In this work, we adopt Chinese Chess (Xiangqi) as a challenging and rich testbed due to its intricate rules and spatial complexity. To advance LLMs' strategic competence in such environments, we propose a training framework tailored to Xiangqi, built upon a large-scale dataset of five million board-move pairs enhanced with expert annotations and engine evaluations. Building on this foundation, we introduce Xiangqi-R1, a 7B-parameter model trained in multi-stage manner: (1) fine-tuning for legal move prediction to capture basic spatial rules, (2) incorporating strategic annotations to improve decision-making, and (3) applying reinforcement learning via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with multi-dimensional reward signals to enhance reasoning stability. Our Experimental results indicate that, despite their size and power, general-purpose LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance in these tasks. Compared to general-purpose LLMs, Xiangqi-R1 greatly advances with an 18% rise in move legality and a 22% boost in analysis accuracy. Our results point to a promising path for creating general strategic intelligence in spatially complex areas.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

How should one judge whether a given large language model (LLM) can reliably perform economic reasoning? Most existing LLM benchmarks focus on specific applications and fail to present the model with a rich variety of economic tasks. A notable exception is Raman et al. [2024], who offer an approach for comprehensively benchmarking strategic decision-making; however, this approach fails to address the non-strategic settings prevalent in microeconomics, such as supply-and-demand analysis. We address this gap by taxonomizing microeconomic reasoning into 58 distinct elements, focusing on the logic of supply and demand, each grounded in up to 10 distinct domains, 5 perspectives, and 3 types. The generation of benchmark data across this combinatorial space is powered by a novel LLM-assisted data generation protocol that we dub auto-STEER, which generates a set of questions by adapting handwritten templates to target new domains and perspectives. Because it offers an automated way of generating fresh questions, auto-STEER mitigates the risk that LLMs will be trained to over-fit evaluation benchmarks; we thus hope that it will serve as a useful tool both for evaluating and fine-tuning models for years to come. We demonstrate the usefulness of our benchmark via a case study on 27 LLMs, ranging from small open-source models to the current state of the art. We examined each model's ability to solve microeconomic problems across our whole taxonomy and present the results across a range of prompting strategies and scoring metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive action sequence prediction capabilities but often struggle with dynamic, long-horizon tasks such as real-time strategic games. In a game such as StarCraftII (SC2), agents need to manage resource constraints and adapt to evolving battlefield situations in a partially observable environment. This often overwhelms exisiting LLM-based approaches. To address these challenges, we propose a hierarchical multi-agent framework that employs specialized imitation learning agents under a meta-controller called Strategic Planner (SP). By expert demonstrations, each specialized agent learns a distinctive strategy, such as aerial support or defensive maneuvers, and produces coherent, structured multistep action sequences. The SP then orchestrates these proposals into a single, environmentally adaptive plan that ensures local decisions aligning with long-term strategies. We call this HIMA (Hierarchical Imitation Multi-Agent). We also present TEXTSCII-ALL, a comprehensive SC2 testbed that encompasses all race match combinations in SC2. Our empirical results show that HIMA outperforms state of the arts in strategic clarity, adaptability, and computational efficiency, underscoring the potential of combining specialized imitation modules with meta-level orchestration to develop more robust, general-purpose AI agents.

As large language models (LLMs) advance across diverse tasks, the need for comprehensive evaluation beyond single metrics becomes increasingly important. To fully assess LLM intelligence, it is crucial to examine their interactive dynamics and strategic behaviors. We present LLMsPark, a game theory-based evaluation platform that measures LLMs' decision-making strategies and social behaviors in classic game-theoretic settings, providing a multi-agent environment to explore strategic depth. Our system cross-evaluates 15 leading LLMs (both commercial and open-source) using leaderboard rankings and scoring mechanisms. Higher scores reflect stronger reasoning and strategic capabilities, revealing distinct behavioral patterns and performance differences across models. This work introduces a novel perspective for evaluating LLMs' strategic intelligence, enriching existing benchmarks and broadening their assessment in interactive, game-theoretic scenarios. The benchmark and rankings are publicly available at https://llmsparks.github.io/.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

Agents built with large language models (LLMs) have shown great potential across a wide range of domains. However, in complex decision-making tasks, pure LLM-based agents tend to exhibit intrinsic bias in their choice of actions, which is inherited from the model's training data and results in suboptimal performance. To develop strategic language agents, i.e., agents that generate flexible language actions and possess strong decision-making abilities, we propose a novel framework that powers LLM-based agents with reinforcement learning (RL). We consider Werewolf, a popular social deduction game, as a challenging testbed that emphasizes versatile communication and strategic gameplay. To mitigate the intrinsic bias in language actions, our agents use an LLM to perform deductive reasoning and generate a diverse set of action candidates. Then an RL policy trained to optimize the decision-making ability chooses an action from the candidates to play in the game. Extensive experiments show that our agents overcome the intrinsic bias and outperform existing LLM-based agents in the Werewolf game. We also conduct human-agent experiments and find that our agents achieve human-level performance and demonstrate strong strategic play.

Trading is a highly competitive task that requires a combination of strategy, knowledge, and psychological fortitude. With the recent success of large language models(LLMs), it is appealing to apply the emerging intelligence of LLM agents in this competitive arena and understanding if they can outperform professional traders. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of the current research on using LLMs as agents in financial trading. We summarize the common architecture used in the agent, the data inputs, and the performance of LLM trading agents in backtesting as well as the challenges presented in these research. This survey aims to provide insights into the current state of LLM-based financial trading agents and outline future research directions in this field.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

StarCraft II is a challenging benchmark for AI agents due to the necessity of both precise micro level operations and strategic macro awareness. Previous works, such as Alphastar and SCC, achieve impressive performance on tackling StarCraft II , however, still exhibit deficiencies in long term strategic planning and strategy interpretability. Emerging large language model (LLM) agents, such as Voyage and MetaGPT, presents the immense potential in solving intricate tasks. Motivated by this, we aim to validate the capabilities of LLMs on StarCraft II, a highly complex RTS game.To conveniently take full advantage of LLMs` reasoning abilities, we first develop textual StratCraft II environment, called TextStarCraft II, which LLM agent can interact. Secondly, we propose a Chain of Summarization method, including single frame summarization for processing raw observations and multi frame summarization for analyzing game information, providing command recommendations, and generating strategic decisions. Our experiment consists of two parts: first, an evaluation by human experts, which includes assessing the LLMs`s mastery of StarCraft II knowledge and the performance of LLM agents in the game; second, the in game performance of LLM agents, encompassing aspects like win rate and the impact of Chain of Summarization.Experiment results demonstrate that: 1. LLMs possess the relevant knowledge and complex planning abilities needed to address StarCraft II scenarios; 2. Human experts consider the performance of LLM agents to be close to that of an average player who has played StarCraft II for eight years; 3. LLM agents are capable of defeating the built in AI at the Harder(Lv5) difficulty level. We have open sourced the code and released demo videos of LLM agent playing StarCraft II.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Most existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods suffer from the issues of generalizability and consistency, as they often rely on instance-specific solutions that may not be applicable to other cases and lack task-level consistency in their reasoning steps. To address these limitations, we propose a comprehensive framework, StrategyLLM, harnessing the capabilities of LLMs to construct generalizable and consistent few-shot prompts for various tasks automatically. To this end, StrategyLLM employs four LLM-based agents: strategy generator, executor, optimizer, and evaluator, working together to generate, evaluate, and select promising strategies for a given task. The experimental results demonstrate that StrategyLLM outperforms the competitive baseline CoT-SC that requires human-annotated solutions on 13 datasets across 4 challenging tasks without human involvement, including math reasoning (34.21% rightarrow 38.79%), commonsense reasoning (70.3% rightarrow 72.5%), algorithmic reasoning (51.7% rightarrow 62.0%), and symbolic reasoning (30.0% rightarrow 79.2%).

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Large Language Models (LLM) are increasingly being explored for problem-solving tasks. However, their strategic planning capability is often viewed with skepticism. Recent studies have incorporated the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm to augment the planning capacity of LLM. Despite its potential, MCTS relies on extensive sampling simulations to approximate the true reward distribution, which leads to two primary issues. Firstly, MCTS is effective for tasks like the Game of Go, where simulation results can yield objective rewards (e.g., 1 for a win and 0 for a loss). However, for tasks such as question answering, the result of a simulation is the answer to the question, which cannot yield an objective reward without the ground truth. Secondly, obtaining statistically significant reward estimations typically requires a sample size exceeding 30 simulations, resulting in excessive token usage and time consumption. To address these challenges, we present the Multi-Agent System with Tactical Execution and Reasoning using LLM Specialized MCTS (MASTER), a novel framework that coordinates agent recruitment and communication through LLM specialized MCTS. This system autonomously adjusts the number of agents based on task complexity and ensures focused communication among them. Comprehensive experiments across various tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed framework. It achieves 76% accuracy on HotpotQA and 80% on WebShop, setting new state-of-the-art performance on these datasets.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Human experts often struggle to select the best option from a large set of items with multiple competing objectives, a process bottlenecked by the difficulty of formalizing complex, implicit preferences. To address this, we introduce LISTEN, a framework that leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) as a zero-shot preference oracle, guided only by an expert's high-level priorities in natural language. To operate within LLM constraints like context windows and inference costs, we propose two iterative algorithms: LISTEN-U, which uses the LLM to refine a parametric utility function, and LISTEN-T, a non-parametric method that performs tournament-style selections over small batches of solutions. Evaluated on diverse tasks including flight booking, shopping, and exam scheduling, our results show LISTEN-U excels when preferences are parametrically aligned (a property we measure with a novel concordance metric), while LISTEN-T offers more robust performance. This work explores a promising direction for steering complex multi-objective decisions directly with natural language, reducing the cognitive burden of traditional preference elicitation.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

When selecting data for training large-scale models, standard practice is to filter for examples that match human notions of data quality. Such filtering yields qualitatively clean datapoints that intuitively should improve model behavior. However, in practice the opposite can often happen: we find that selecting according to similarity with "high quality" data sources may not increase (and can even hurt) performance compared to randomly selecting data. To develop better methods for selecting data, we start by framing dataset selection as an optimization problem that we can directly solve for: given target tasks, a learning algorithm, and candidate data, select the subset that maximizes model performance. This framework thus avoids handpicked notions of data quality, and instead models explicitly how the learning process uses train datapoints to predict on the target tasks. Our resulting method greatly improves language model (LM) performance on both pre-specified tasks and previously unseen tasks. Specifically, choosing target tasks representative of standard LM problems and evaluating on diverse held-out benchmarks, our selected datasets provide a 2x compute multiplier over baseline methods.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

Restart strategies are an important factor in the performance of conflict-driven Davis Putnam style SAT solvers. Selecting a good restart strategy for a problem instance can enhance the performance of a solver. Inspired by recent success applying machine learning techniques to predict the runtime of SAT solvers, we present a method which uses machine learning to boost solver performance through a smart selection of the restart strategy. Based on easy to compute features, we train both a satisfiability classifier and runtime models. We use these models to choose between restart strategies. We present experimental results comparing this technique with the most commonly used restart strategies. Our results demonstrate that machine learning is effective in improving solver performance.

Algorithmic trading requires short-term decisions aligned with long-term financial goals. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored for such tactical decisions, its adoption remains limited by myopic behavior and opaque policy rationale. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strategic reasoning and multi-modal financial signal interpretation when guided by well-designed prompts. We propose a hybrid system where LLMs generate high-level trading strategies to guide RL agents in their actions. We evaluate (i) the rationale of LLM-generated strategies via expert review, and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Maximum Drawdown (MDD) of LLM-guided agents versus unguided baselines. Results show improved return and risk metrics over standard RL.

From out-competing grandmasters in chess to informing high-stakes healthcare decisions, emerging methods from artificial intelligence are increasingly capable of making complex and strategic decisions in diverse, high-dimensional, and uncertain situations. But can these methods help us devise robust strategies for managing environmental systems under great uncertainty? Here we explore how reinforcement learning, a subfield of artificial intelligence, approaches decision problems through a lens similar to adaptive environmental management: learning through experience to gradually improve decisions with updated knowledge. We review where reinforcement learning (RL) holds promise for improving evidence-informed adaptive management decisions even when classical optimization methods are intractable. For example, model-free deep RL might help identify quantitative decision strategies even when models are nonidentifiable. Finally, we discuss technical and social issues that arise when applying reinforcement learning to adaptive management problems in the environmental domain. Our synthesis suggests that environmental management and computer science can learn from one another about the practices, promises, and perils of experience-based decision-making.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Automating machine learning has achieved remarkable technological developments in recent years, and building an automated machine learning pipeline is now an essential task. The model ensemble is the technique of combining multiple models to get a better and more robust model. However, existing automated machine learning tends to be simplistic in handling the model ensemble, where the ensemble strategy is fixed, such as stacked generalization. There have been many techniques on different ensemble methods, especially ensemble selection, and the fixed ensemble strategy limits the upper limit of the model's performance. In this article, we present a novel framework for automated machine learning. Our framework incorporates advances in dynamic ensemble selection, and to our best knowledge, our approach is the first in the field of AutoML to search and optimize ensemble strategies. In the comparison experiments, our method outperforms the state-of-the-art automated machine learning frameworks with the same CPU time in 42 classification datasets from the OpenML platform. Ablation experiments on our framework validate the effectiveness of our proposed method.

Should prediction models always deliver a prediction? In the pursuit of maximum predictive performance, critical considerations of reliability and fairness are often overshadowed, particularly when it comes to the role of uncertainty. Selective regression, also known as the "reject option," allows models to abstain from predictions in cases of considerable uncertainty. Initially proposed seven decades ago, approaches to selective regression have mostly focused on distribution-based proxies for measuring uncertainty, particularly conditional variance. However, this focus neglects the significant influence of model-specific biases on a model's performance. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to selective regression by leveraging conformal prediction, which provides grounded confidence measures for individual predictions based on model-specific biases. In addition, we propose a standardized evaluation framework to allow proper comparison of selective regression approaches. Via an extensive experimental approach, we demonstrate how our proposed approach, conformalized selective regression, demonstrates an advantage over multiple state-of-the-art baselines.

The inherent capabilities of a language model (LM) and the reasoning strategies it employs jointly determine its performance in reasoning tasks. While test-time scaling is regarded as an effective approach to tackling complex reasoning tasks, it incurs substantial computational costs and often leads to "overthinking", where models become trapped in "thought pitfalls". To address this challenge, we propose Route-To-Reason (RTR), a novel unified routing framework that dynamically allocates both LMs and reasoning strategies according to task difficulty under budget constraints. RTR learns compressed representations of both expert models and reasoning strategies, enabling their joint and adaptive selection at inference time. This method is low-cost, highly flexible, and can be seamlessly extended to arbitrary black-box or white-box models and strategies, achieving true plug-and-play functionality. Extensive experiments across seven open source models and four reasoning strategies demonstrate that RTR achieves an optimal trade-off between accuracy and computational efficiency among all baselines, achieving higher accuracy than the best single model while reducing token usage by over 60%.

Evaluating large language models (LLMs) in complex decision-making is essential for advancing AI's ability for strategic planning and real-time adaptation. However, existing benchmarks for tasks like StarCraft II fail to capture the game's full complexity, such as its complete game context, diverse action spaces, and all playable races. To address this gap, we present SC2Arena, a benchmark that fully supports all playable races, low-level action spaces, and optimizes text-based observations to tackle spatial reasoning challenges. Complementing this, we introduce StarEvolve, a hierarchical framework that integrates strategic planning with tactical execution, featuring iterative self-correction and continuous improvement via fine-tuning on high-quality gameplay data. Its key components include a Planner-Executor-Verifier structure to break down gameplay, and a scoring system for selecting high-quality training samples. Comprehensive analysis using SC2Arena provides valuable insights into developing generalist agents that were not possible with previous benchmarks. Experimental results also demonstrate that our proposed StarEvolve achieves superior performance in strategic planning. Our code, environment, and algorithms are publicly available.

Recent advances in LLMs have enabled their use as autonomous agents across a range of tasks, yet they continue to struggle with formulating and adhering to coherent long-term strategies. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM agents can self-improve when placed in environments that explicitly challenge their strategic planning abilities. Using the board game Settlers of Catan, accessed through the open-source Catanatron framework, we benchmark a progression of LLM-based agents, from a simple game-playing agent to systems capable of autonomously rewriting their own prompts and their player agent's code. We introduce a multi-agent architecture in which specialized roles (Analyzer, Researcher, Coder, and Player) collaborate to iteratively analyze gameplay, research new strategies, and modify the agent's logic or prompt. By comparing manually crafted agents to those evolved entirely by LLMs, we evaluate how effectively these systems can diagnose failure and adapt over time. Our results show that self-evolving agents, particularly when powered by models like Claude 3.7 and GPT-4o, outperform static baselines by autonomously adopting their strategies, passing along sample behavior to game-playing agents, and demonstrating adaptive reasoning over multiple iterations.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

This study evaluates Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents for Dhumbal, a culturally significant multiplayer card game with imperfect information, through a systematic comparison of rule-based, search-based, and learning-based strategies. We formalize Dhumbal's mechanics and implement diverse agents, including heuristic approaches (Aggressive, Conservative, Balanced, Opportunistic), search-based methods such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS), and reinforcement learning approaches including Deep Q-Network (DQN) and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), and a random baseline. Evaluation involves within-category tournaments followed by a cross-category championship. Performance is measured via win rate, economic outcome, Jhyap success, cards discarded per round, risk assessment, and decision efficiency. Statistical significance is assessed using Welch's t-test with Bonferroni correction, effect sizes via Cohen's d, and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Across 1024 simulated rounds, the rule-based Aggressive agent achieves the highest win rate (88.3%, 95% CI: [86.3, 90.3]), outperforming ISMCTS (9.0%) and PPO (1.5%) through effective exploitation of Jhyap declarations. The study contributes a reproducible AI framework, insights into heuristic efficacy under partial information, and open-source code, thereby advancing AI research and supporting digital preservation of cultural games.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) agents is evolving rapidly, driven by the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to autonomously perform and refine tasks with human-like efficiency and adaptability. In this context, multi-agent collaboration has emerged as a promising approach, enabling multiple AI agents to work together to solve complex challenges. This study investigates the application of role-based multi-agent systems to support stock selection in equity research and portfolio management. We present a comprehensive analysis performed by a team of specialized agents and evaluate their stock-picking performance against established benchmarks under varying levels of risk tolerance. Furthermore, we examine the advantages and limitations of employing multi-agent frameworks in equity analysis, offering critical insights into their practical efficacy and implementation challenges.

Leveraging learned strategies in unfamiliar scenarios is fundamental to human intelligence. In reinforcement learning, rationally reusing the policies acquired from other tasks or human experts is critical for tackling problems that are difficult to learn from scratch. In this work, we present a framework called Selective Myopic bEhavior Control~(SMEC), which results from the insight that the short-term behaviors of prior policies are sharable across tasks. By evaluating the behaviors of prior policies via a hybrid value function architecture, SMEC adaptively aggregates the sharable short-term behaviors of prior policies and the long-term behaviors of the task policy, leading to coordinated decisions. Empirical results on a collection of manipulation and locomotion tasks demonstrate that SMEC outperforms existing methods, and validate the ability of SMEC to leverage related prior policies.

Task allocation is a key combinatorial optimization problem, crucial for modern applications such as multi-robot cooperation and resource scheduling. Decision makers must allocate entities to tasks reasonably across different scenarios. However, traditional methods assume static attributes and numbers of tasks and entities, often relying on dynamic programming and heuristic algorithms for solutions. In reality, task allocation resembles Markov decision processes, with dynamically changing task and entity attributes. Thus, algorithms must dynamically allocate tasks based on their states. To address this issue, we propose a two-stage task allocation algorithm based on similarity, utilizing reinforcement learning to learn allocation strategies. The proposed pre-assign strategy allows entities to preselect appropriate tasks, effectively avoiding local optima and thereby better finding the optimal allocation. We also introduce an attention mechanism and a hyperparameter network structure to adapt to the changing number and attributes of entities and tasks, enabling our network structure to generalize to new tasks. Experimental results across multiple environments demonstrate that our algorithm effectively addresses the challenges of dynamic task allocation in practical applications. Compared to heuristic algorithms like genetic algorithms, our reinforcement learning approach better solves dynamic allocation problems and achieves zero-shot generalization to new tasks with good performance. The code is available at https://github.com/yk7333/TaskAllocation.

Summarization models often generate text that is poorly calibrated to quality metrics because they are trained to maximize the likelihood of a single reference (MLE). To address this, recent work has added a calibration step, which exposes a model to its own ranked outputs to improve relevance or, in a separate line of work, contrasts positive and negative sets to improve faithfulness. While effective, much of this work has focused on how to generate and optimize these sets. Less is known about why one setup is more effective than another. In this work, we uncover the underlying characteristics of effective sets. For each training instance, we form a large, diverse pool of candidates and systematically vary the subsets used for calibration fine-tuning. Each selection strategy targets distinct aspects of the sets, such as lexical diversity or the size of the gap between positive and negatives. On three diverse scientific long-form summarization datasets (spanning biomedical, clinical, and chemical domains), we find, among others, that faithfulness calibration is optimal when the negative sets are extractive and more likely to be generated, whereas for relevance calibration, the metric margin between candidates should be maximized and surprise--the disagreement between model and metric defined candidate rankings--minimized. Code to create, select, and optimize calibration sets is available at https://github.com/griff4692/calibrating-summaries

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

Model selection is a strategy aimed at creating accurate and robust models. A key challenge in designing these algorithms is identifying the optimal model for classifying any particular input sample. This paper addresses this challenge and proposes a novel framework for differentiable model selection integrating machine learning and combinatorial optimization. The framework is tailored for ensemble learning, a strategy that combines the outputs of individually pre-trained models, and learns to select appropriate ensemble members for a particular input sample by transforming the ensemble learning task into a differentiable selection program trained end-to-end within the ensemble learning model. Tested on various tasks, the proposed framework demonstrates its versatility and effectiveness, outperforming conventional and advanced consensus rules across a variety of settings and learning tasks.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into search engines to provide natural language responses tailored to user queries. Customers and end-users are also becoming more dependent on these models for quick and easy purchase decisions. In this work, we investigate whether recommendations from LLMs can be manipulated to enhance a product's visibility. We demonstrate that adding a strategic text sequence (STS) -- a carefully crafted message -- to a product's information page can significantly increase its likelihood of being listed as the LLM's top recommendation. To understand the impact of STS, we use a catalog of fictitious coffee machines and analyze its effect on two target products: one that seldom appears in the LLM's recommendations and another that usually ranks second. We observe that the strategic text sequence significantly enhances the visibility of both products by increasing their chances of appearing as the top recommendation. This ability to manipulate LLM-generated search responses provides vendors with a considerable competitive advantage and has the potential to disrupt fair market competition. Just as search engine optimization (SEO) revolutionized how webpages are customized to rank higher in search engine results, influencing LLM recommendations could profoundly impact content optimization for AI-driven search services. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/llm-rank-optimizer.

We present the first evaluation harness that enables any out-of-the-box, local, Large Language Models (LLMs) to play full-press Diplomacy without fine-tuning or specialized training. Previous work required frontier LLMs, or fine-tuning, due to the high complexity and information density of Diplomacy's game state. Combined with the high variance of matches, these factors made Diplomacy prohibitive for study. In this work, we used data-driven iteration to optimize a textual game state representation such that a 24B model can reliably complete matches without any fine tuning. We develop tooling to facilitate hypothesis testing and statistical analysis, and we present case studies on persuasion, aggressive playstyles, and performance across a range of models. We conduct a variety of experiments across many popular LLMs, finding the larger models perform the best, but the smaller models still play adequately. We also introduce Critical State Analysis: an experimental protocol for rapidly iterating and analyzing key moments in a game at depth. Our harness democratizes the evaluation of strategic reasoning in LLMs by eliminating the need for fine-tuning, and it provides insights into how these capabilities emerge naturally from widely used LLMs. Our code is available in the supplement and will be open sourced.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

How areas of land are allocated for different uses, such as forests, urban areas, and agriculture, has a large effect on the terrestrial carbon balance, and therefore climate change. Based on available historical data on land-use changes and a simulation of the associated carbon emissions and removals, a surrogate model can be learned that makes it possible to evaluate the different options available to decision-makers efficiently. An evolutionary search process can then be used to discover effective land-use policies for specific locations. Such a system was built on the Project Resilience platform and evaluated with the Land-Use Harmonization dataset LUH2 and the bookkeeping model BLUE. It generates Pareto fronts that trade off carbon impact and amount of land-use change customized to different locations, thus providing a proof-of-concept tool that is potentially useful for land-use planning.

The growing emotional stress in modern society has increased the demand for Emotional Support Conversations (ESC). While Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise for ESC, they face two key challenges: (1) low strategy selection accuracy, and (2) preference bias, limiting their adaptability to emotional needs of users. Existing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) struggles to address these issues, as it rigidly trains models on single gold-standard responses without modeling nuanced strategy trade-offs. To overcome these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Strategy Optimization (CSO), a novel approach that optimizes strategy selection preferences at each dialogue turn. We first leverage Monte Carlo Tree Search to construct ESC-Pro, a high-quality preference dataset with turn-level strategy-response pairs. Training on ESC-Pro with CSO improves both strategy accuracy and bias mitigation, enabling LLMs to generate more empathetic and contextually appropriate responses. Experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, and Qwen2.5-7B demonstrate that CSO outperforms standard SFT, highlighting the efficacy of fine-grained, turn-level preference modeling in ESC.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Effective information seeking in the vast and ever-growing digital landscape requires balancing expansive search with strategic reasoning. Current large language model (LLM)-based agents struggle to achieve this balance due to limitations in search breadth and reasoning depth, where slow, serial querying restricts coverage of relevant sources and noisy raw inputs disrupt the continuity of multi-step reasoning. To address these challenges, we propose BrowseMaster, a scalable framework built around a programmatically augmented planner-executor agent pair. The planner formulates and adapts search strategies based on task constraints, while the executor conducts efficient, targeted retrieval to supply the planner with concise, relevant evidence. This division of labor preserves coherent, long-horizon reasoning while sustaining broad and systematic exploration, overcoming the trade-off that limits existing agents. Extensive experiments on challenging English and Chinese benchmarks show that BrowseMaster consistently outperforms open-source and proprietary baselines, achieving scores of 30.0 on BrowseComp-en and 46.5 on BrowseComp-zh, which demonstrates its strong capability in complex, reasoning-heavy information-seeking tasks at scale.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

The rapid advancement in large language models (LLMs) has brought forth a diverse range of models with varying capabilities that excel in different tasks and domains. However, selecting the optimal LLM for user queries often involves a challenging trade-off between accuracy and cost, a problem exacerbated by the diverse demands of individual queries. In this work, we present a novel framework that formulates the LLM selection process as a multi-armed bandit problem, enabling dynamic and intelligent routing of queries to the most appropriate model. Our approach incorporates a preference-conditioned dynamic routing mechanism, allowing users to specify their preferences at inference time, thereby offering a customizable balance between performance and cost. Additionally, our selection policy is designed to generalize to unseen LLMs, ensuring adaptability to new models as they emerge. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves significant improvements in both accuracy and cost-effectiveness across various LLM platforms, showcasing the potential of our framework to adaptively optimize LLM selection in real-world scenarios.